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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Pli()I•:B~J I-I. DURRANT, 
~ .f _j ~f AtJtJ8ll619~ ~. 
-n;;.-
~A~CY PELTON", 
Rjjx)l~-f 
Case 
No.10082 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This i~ an appeal from a judgment in favor of the 
respondent for damages occurring whe~eh~\e driven 
hy the J~~~ collided 'Yith the"~' ~~ ,~/vehicle 
'vhich \Yas stalled on W asa.tch Boulevard in or partly 
\\·ithin a tr-aveled traffic lane at about 6 :00 p.m. on March 
11, 1963. 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The case 'Yas submitted to a jury which returned 
a verdict for respondent in the amount of $656.37, plus 
eo~t~. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks vacation of the judgment entered 
upon the aforesaid verdict and an order of this Court 
that the case be remanded for retrial upon proper in-
structions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 11, 1963, at about the hour of 6:00 p.m., 
the appellant was proceeding in a southerly direction 
along the public highway known as Wasatch Boulevard. 
She had progressed beyond the intersection of that 
Boulevard with the Parley's Canyon highway (the ex-
tension of 21st South Street) and was traversing the val-
ley through which Wasatch Boulevard passes at this loca-
tion. It was snowing heavily (R 126, 133, 140). The time 
was app-roximately 6 :00 p.m., and it was already dark 
( R 133, 140). All the vehicles on the highway at the time 
(except for plaintiff's vehicle as to which there is conflict 
in the evidence) had their lights burning. Respondent's 
vehicle had stalled on Wasatch Boulevard at a point 
which is a short distance up the south slope of the valley. 
According to respondent's testimony, her vehicle was 
stalled at such a position that it merely projected into 
the west lane of traffic (R 98). The testimony of the 
appellant and two disinterested witnesses is, however, 
that respondent's vehicle was stalled directly in the mid-
dle of the west lane of traffic (R 143, 158). As the highway 
is constructed through the aforesaid valley, it curves dis-
tinctly to the right as one moves up the south slope. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 7.) Appellant was driving her 
vehicle in the right or westernmost lane of traffic at a 
2 
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spt'l'd \vhich was well within the posted speed limit 
( R 13:-J, 140). There is no contradiction of her testimony 
thnt her vision was then restricted by the falling sno"" 
and the advC'nt of darkness. At the moment she began 
b.- r ascent of the south slope, the difficulties of seeing 
herume more pronounc.ed as her headlights were beamed 
into the di rPet ion of snowfall, and the headlights of on-
<'oming ears rame into her line of vision (R 133). It 
wns at this point in her progress that, as her eyes be-
enme adjusted to the new circumstances and she had pro-
re(ldcd far enough around the curve so that respondent's 
car \ras directly in front of her, appellant became aware 
thnt respondent's vehicle was in her path and that some 
{\ffort must be made to avoid collision (R 134). There 
is conflict in the evidence as to whether respondent 
had taken any action to warn oncoming drivers of the 
presence of her vehicle. Appellant's witnesses testified 
that the lights of the respondent's vehicle were not even 
turned on (R 141, 158). Appellant was unable to turn 
from the \YC'sternmost lane of traffic into the adjoining 
lane because of traffic on her left ( R 128). Even though 
~he "·as proceeding at a slower rate of speed than had 
l'l'~pondent previously been proceeding (R 48) and slower 
than the speed of other cars on Wasatch Boulevard 
(R 140), she "\Vas unable to bring her car to a stop ·in time 
to avoid collision with plaintiff's vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THE APPELLANT HAD, IN 
3 
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ESSENCE, AN OBLIGATION TO l\IAINTAIN 
SUCH CONTROL OVER HER VEHICLE 
THAT SHE COULD BRING IT TO A CO~I­
PLETE STOP, WHATEVER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF VISIBILITY MIGHT BE, 
WITHIN THE RANGE OF HER VISION. 
One of appellant's principal contentions, in deny-
ing liability under the facts of the instant case, \Vas that 
she could not, in the exercise of reasonable care, have 
avoided the collision which is the basis of respondent's 
complaint. We believe this Court has been most explicit, in 
its decisions, as to the responsibilities of the drivers of 
vehicles under the circumstances of the instant case. 
While the driver who drives his car into the rear of a 
stalled vehicle must certainly justify his failure to stop 
or turn in order to avoid the collision, this Court has dis-
tinctly recognized that such failures can be satisfactorily 
explained so that the collision falls into the category of 
''unavoidable accidents''. This Court has had occasion 
to consider a number of cases where the driver of the 
following vehicle undertook to explain his failure to 
stop on the basis of visual difficulties such as darkness, 
the fact that snow was falling, the fact that the lights of 
oncoming cars blinded him and the fact that the curva-
ture of the highway prevented his becoming aware of the 
stalled vehicle in time to take effective action even though 
his speed was, under the circumstances of which he had 
knowledge, reasonable. 
We believe that, where this Court has stated with 
great particularity what the responsibilities of individ-
uals are under a given and commonly recurring situa-
4 
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tion it i~ tlH' obligation of the trial court, \vhen requested, 
~ 
to g-ivtl nn inst ruetion 'vhich is oriented to the situation 
rathPr than to g-ive a general instruction in terms which 
hn\'P little meaning to the la.y mind. 
In thP instant ease, the Court refused to give the re-
qHPStPd instruction on unavoidable accident which had 
relation to the sperific facts of the case. The instructions 
in fat·t g-ivt'n hy the Court as to the duty of the appellant 
WPI'P an adoption of the doctrine of Dalley v. Midwestern 
/Jairy. 80 Utah 331, a 1932 case which has been fre-
quf'ntly criticized hy this and other courts. That case 
stated the controlling rule to be "That it is negligence as 
n mnttPr of la'v for a person to drive an automobile upon 
a traveled public highway" * * * "at such a rate of speed 
that ~aid automobile cannot be stopped within the dis-
tnnct' at 'vhich the operator of said car is able to see 
objects upon the highway in front of him.'' The Court's 
Instruction No. 6 in the instant case is a paraphrase of 
the quoted language. For the Court's convenience, we 
r(\produce it here: 
'' \"'" ou are instructed that there was a duty on 
tla"' part of the defendant to keep her vehicle 
always under control so as to avoid an accident. 
She had no right to assume that the road was 
clear but under all circumstances and at all times 
she "·as required to be Yigilant and to anticipate 
and expect the presence of other vehicles upon the 
highway. The test of control is the ability to stop, 
slo",. down or turn out quickly and easily. When 
this result is not accomplished, the inference can 
readily be made that the vehicle was running too 
fast or that proper effort to control it was not 
5 
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made. If, therefore, you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence in this case that at and im-
mediately prior to the time of the accident the de-
fendant did not have her vehicle under proper con-
trol, then in that event the defendant was neg-
ligent.'' 
Not only did the trial court instruct the jury in the 
doctrine of the Dalley case by Instruction No. 6, the 
Court emphasized and re-emphasized that doctrine in In-
structions 7 and 8. No juror, having read Instructions 
6, 7 and 8, could come to any conclusion about the law to 
be applied except that a driver is negligent if he runs 
into any obstruction on the highway which does not drop 
out of the sky immediately in front of him. For this jury, 
the only relief from the stark adjuration that a driver 
must always ''keep her vehicle always under control so 
as to a void an accident'' 'vas the J .I.F. U. instruction on 
unavoidable accidents which is, of course, stated in gen-
eral terms and could not be related to the instant case by 
a conscientious juror in view of the fact that the Court 
had particularly instructed that a defendant must always 
be able to stop within the range of his vision. 
Since the trial court was so clearly persuaded to the 
point of view of Dalley v. Midwestern Daliry, it is ap-
propriate for us now to consider the extent to which that 
case expresses the present position of this Court. We 
believe the Dalley case has been so differentiated and its 
application so restricted in later Utah cases that it can no 
longer be cited as a statement of the basic la'v of this 
State. 
6 
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The defendant's vPhicle, in the Dalley case, was 
stalled on a. straight strctrh of highway, there was noth-
ing to obstruct the plaintiff's vision, and weather con-
dition~ \\'Pre good. The Court sustained a directed ver-
dict n~ninst the plaintiff (the driver of the following car 
which collided 'vith the stalled vehicle) and stated the 
('nntrolling nlle to be "that it is negligence as a matter 
of lnw for a person to drive an automobile upon a trav-
<'led public high"·ay'' ... "at such a rate of speed that 
said automobile cannot be stopped within the distance 
at whirh the operator of said car is able to see objects 
upon the high,vay in front of him.'' 
It should be noted that, in each of the Dalley case 
and the cases therein cited, there was comment about the 
plaintiff's ''dilemma'' - i. e. either his lights were inade-
quate or he failed to keep a reasonable lookout. Where 
the facts as to Yisibility are changed, however, the Utah 
Court haR come to entirely different conclusions a.s to the 
patency of the following driver's negligence. In Trimble 
v. ["nion Pacific Stages, 142 Pac. 2d 764 (1943), the 
Court review·ed the Dalley case and its antecedents and, 
limiting those cases to their facts, said ''We do not be-
lieve this (the Dalley doctrine) to be the correct rule of 
la"·'' "·hen applied to a situation where there is fog, 
smoke or some other obstruction of the following driver's 
Yision. Some fifteen cases from almost as many juris-
dictions were cited in support of the Court's conclusion 
that mere failure to stop within vision's range is not 
nec.essarily negligence where vision is obstructed by fac-
tors beyond the control of the following driver. 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The statement of the Trimble case that negligence 
must be proved by more than the fact of collision 'vas 
reaffirmed by the Court in Hodges v. Waite, 270 P. 2d 
461, where the obstruction was a curve in the highway. 
There again, the question of whether the following driver 
(the plaintiff in that case) was negligent was a matter 
for the jury. The judicial statement which most effee-
tively lays the ghost of the Dalley case, however, is found 
in Federa.ted Milk Producers Association v. Stateu,ide 
Plumbing & Heating, 358 Pac. 2d 348 (1961). ''The Dalley 
ca.se rule on which defendant relies,'' said Justice Wade, 
''requires a showing from which it must inevitably fol-
low that plaintiff did not keep a lookout ahead ... or 
did not heed what he saw or he could not see ... becau,se 
his lights were not such as are prescribed by law." (Our 
emphasis) 
There is no shred of evidence in the instant case that 
appellant failed to keep a lookout or that her lights 
were less than what the law requires. The credible evi-
dence is that she was unable to stop within a few feet 
after she discerned through the snow that a snow-covered 
car with its lights off was stalled directly in her traffic 
lane in the darkness ahead. 
In the instant case, the facts could hardly more clear-
ly establish that we are dealing with a situation where 
Da.lley v. Midwestern DaJiry has no application. Every-
one agrees that it was dark enough so that headlights 
\Ycre necessary for vision. Appellant's \vitnesses, 
who have no interest in the outcome of this case, testi-
fied that it was not merely dusk but dark. Exhibit P-6 
8 
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t-stablishPs the time at which the sun descended below a 
t'lut horizon. The Court may, of course, take knowledge 
of the fact that the Oquirrh Range rises well above the 
t'lnt horizon in the path of the sun's descent 'vest of the 
ll.e('ident site during early spring. That it was snow-
ing heavily at the time of the accident is also a matter 
of .~Pneral agreement. :\lr. and Mrs. Anderson were 
vpry positive in their statements as to the effect of the 
sno\\' to obscure vision. The fact that the highway curves 
so that a stalled vehicle at the accident site would not 
be in direct line of a following driver's vision for any 
great distance is made clear by an examination of de-
ff•ndant 's Exhibit 7. The evidence is also \vithout 
contradiction that there were northbound cars on the 
highway, that their headlights were burning and that the 
beams of their lights were occasionally directed into 
appellant's eyes as she began her ascent of the south 
slope of the dip. All that the Court need judicially no-
tice to complete the picture of the appellant in a pre-
dicament dangerous for reasons beyond her control is 
the physical fact that falling snow tends to obscure vision 
more as one drives upward into it. 
Under the facts of this case, Instructions 6, 7 and 8 
were entirely improper, and it was improper for the 
Court to deliver them even if the Court had also given 
some instruction reasonably calculated to impart the 
respondent's legal position. In the absence of an instruc-
tion reasonably communicating to the jury the view of 
the Trimble case, the Hodges case and the Federated Milk 
Jlroducers case, the trial court's delivery of Instructions 
6, 7 and 8 was clear and prejudicial error. 
9 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED I N S T R U C-
TION NO. 11. 
There is abundant evidence, most of which is not 
contradicted in the slightest by respondent, that a great 
many factors contributed to appellant's inability to see 
respondent's stalled car. There were the darkness, the 
falling snow, the change in light refraction as appel-
lant's car began to ascend, the glare of oncoming head-
lights, the curvature of the road, and the natural camou-
flage of plaintiff's snow-covered car. Defendant did 
not even have the benefit of plaintiff's tail lights if \YC 
are to believe her testimony and that of the Andersons, 
the only disinterested witnesses. 
Clearly, the evidence brings this case within the 
scope of the doctrine so carefully stated by this Court in 
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., Inc. v. Statewide 
Plumbing & Heating Co. (supra). This Court there re-
viewed its several previous decisions on the point and 
approved the view of the Washington Court that, when 
visibility becomes difficult, a driver is not obliged to stop. 
If, indeed, the law were to impose a duty on motorists 
to stop or come to a near stop under such conditions, 
traffic would stop entirely with the most cautious driver. 
Obviously, a driver beginning to ascend a hill during a 
snow storm acts reasonably if he tries to maintain some 
momentum. He may other,vise become a highway ob-
struction himself. 
10 
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The statement of doctrine in the Federated Milk case, 
to whieh we have referred, is this: 
''The unseeability of substantial objects on the 
highway in time to avoid an accident may depend 
on many things other than inattention, faulty 
headlights, or failure to give heed to what 'vas 
there to be seen. A sudden heavy smoke, fog, 
snow or rain storm, lightning or approaching 
headlights or a combination of some or all of these 
clements, coupled with the negligence of the other 
party, may make an accident unavoidable re-
gardless of how alert and competent a driver is or 
how well equipped his car is with brakes, lights 
and other necessary appliances. The visibility of 
substantial objects may depend on their size, 
shape, color or whether they absorb or reflect light 
or blend with or stand out in contrast to the back-
ground. To be alert to all surrounding conditions, 
to have good eyesight, to have proper headlights 
and brakes and to keep the vehicle under relatively 
safe control are all very important, but under 
some circumstances all of these things are not suf-
ficient to enable a reasonably prudent driver to 
avoid an accident.'' (From page 298 of the Utah 
Report.) 
This is precisely the instruction appellant requested 
the Court to deliver (Defendant's Requested Instruc-
tion No. 11 ; Record p. 49). The Court refused to do 
so, even though the authority for the requested instruc-
tion was rited and shown to the Court. Instead, the 
Court gave a general instruction on unavoidable acci-
dent and gave three specific instructions conveying the 
view that a driver must, at all times, be able to come 
to a full stop within the range of his vision and that one 
\vho stalls a car, however negligently, upon a highway 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
may assume that following drivers will be able to see 
and avoid the stalled car. In short, the trial court dP-
liberately ignored the last pronouncement of this Court 
as to the obligations of motorists under conditions of 
difficult visibility. 
Appellant contends the failure of the trial court to 
give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 11 consti-
tutes prejudicial error. No conscientious juror could have 
found this accident was "unavoidable" in the face of 
the instructions 6, 7 and 8 given by the trial court. Had 
defendant's instruction been given, no conscientious 
juror could have found otherwise than that the acci-
dent was unavoidable. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED I N S T R U C-
TION NO. 13. 
Respondent filed her complaint in this matter in June 
of 1963 over her attorney's signature. In Paragraph 1 
of that complaint, she alleges that her car was "stalled, 
out of gas'' on the highway at the time of the accident. 
Respondent persisted in this statement of fact through the 
pretrial conference, and the pretrial order framed, as an 
issue, "Thether or not respondent's failure "to have her 
car properly fueled so the same would not run out of gas 
at a dangerous time and place'' constituted negligence. 
Appellant briefed the point and relied upon respondent's 
admitted failure to keep gas in her car as a defense. 
It ""as not until the trial of the case that the respond-
ent made any· effort to amend her pleadings to avoid the 
12 
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pffpet of tht' admission in her pleadings that she had 
run out of g-ns. I >uring the trial, respondent testified that 
ht'r gus gagP sho,ved an adequate gas supply at the time 
of the accident anrl that she later drove the car before 
it \\'ns refuelPtl. Appellant objected to such testimony 
and indicated to the Court that plaintiff should not be 
permit ted to tPstify contrary to the allegations of her 
<'ontplaint particularly when defendant had no reason 
to anticipate such testimony. The officer who investi-
gntt~d the accident might have seen the gas gage. The 
people who towed the car away may have refueled it . 
.. \ ppellant made no effort to obtain such evidence be-
rause the need for it appeared to be lacking. Neverthe-
less, respondent \Yas permitted by the Court to amend her 
eomplaint at the conclusion of her evidence to delete the 
ref{'rl'nre to her having run out of gas. 
~\ppellant having objected to the amendment of the 
romplaint and the introduction of evidence that the car 
stalled for any reason other than lack of fuel as alleged 
in the complaint, then asked the court to instruct the 
jury that it must find plaintiff had run out of fuel and 
to consider whether plaintiff was or was not negligent 
on that basis. The Court refused to do so. 
The only basis upon which amendments to conform 
to the evidence are properly made is Rule 15(b), Utah 
Rult"~ of Civil Procedure. That rule reads in its entirety 
as follows: 
• ' .... \.)IEXD)IE~Ts To CoNFORM To THE EVIDENCE. 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
13 
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by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of th(l 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issue~. If 
evidenee is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the plead-
ings, the court may allo"'" the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of 
the aetion will be subserved thereby and the ob-
jecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon thr merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, 
to enable the objecting party to meet such eYi-
dence. '' 
The rule has application only to issues not raised by the 
pleadings and permits amendment which W'ill cause the 
pleadings to raise the issues as they \Vere posed by the 
evidence. It is not true that the pleadings in this case are 
silent on the issue of whether respondent permitted her 
vehicle to run out of gas. Respondent alleged that she did, 
and appellent admitted it. That issue was fully dis-
posed of by the pleadings. We contend it \\Tas error 
for the trial court to permit the amendment over objec-
tion. In any event, appellant should have been given 
an opportunity to develop her evidence on the point. 
We believe the defense of eontributory negligence based 
on fuel exhaustion is a meritorious defense. At least one 
court has ruled that it is negligence as a matter of law 
to obstruct a high,vay because of fuel exhaustion. In 
14 
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K rller v. Brenemarn, 153 Wash. 208, 279 Pac. 588, 67 
.\. L. R. 92, the Court said: 
"II is first act of negligence was in operating it 
over the high,vay in a condition to become stalled 
for want of a sufficient supply of gasoline.'' 
''A motor vehicle is a complicated piece of 
mrrhanism, and some part of it may give way and 
cause it to stall, no matter what degree of care the 
operator may have exercised to keep it in prop~r 
condition, and it is a want of such care to pernnt 
it to stall for 'vant of a sufficient supply of gaso-
line.'' 
Research has revealed no judicial statement of a 
contrary view.1 
CONCLUSION 
~lost of the Utah cases which have posed the issue 
now before this Court have been cases when the follow-
ing driver was plaintiff, not defendant. Even in Dolley 
v. J/ idwestern Dairy, the plaintiff was the following 
driver who ran into the back of a truck on a clear day, 
on a straight stretch of road when road conditions were 
excellent. It is usually the driver who obstructs the 
highway who is called upon to explain his conduct. 
In the instant case, appellant was unable to avoid col-
lision by reason of a combination of circumstances beyond 
her control. This Court has frequently commented upon 
and clearly defined the standard of care which must be 
satisfied by people driving under conditions of poor visi-
1 See discussion in Pot'tl v. Herotl, 353 P. 2d 702 (Okla. 1960). 
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bility. Appellant is a "·orking woman \vho \Yas dri,·ing 
her two little children home from a day care center at 
dinner time in a snow storm. The trial court so instruct-
ed the jury that it was obliged to find that she \\'as duty 
bound to expect that respondent (or someone of like hab-
its) \\·ould stall a car in the middle of the traffic lane of 
Salt Lake County's major freeway. \Ve believe the needs 
of society are badly served by any rule of la"\\r \Yhich 
\vould require her to park under such circumstances. We 
submit that she \vas not given a fair trial by a jury 
instructed as this one was. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, ?\IECHAl\1 &. PRATT 
FRANK J. ALLEN" 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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